

Message Text

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2877

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USNATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0301

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E O 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JUNE 1 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE 161ST PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WAS HELD ON JUNE 1 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF GDR REP (OESER), BULGARIAN REP (DICHEV) DELIVERED THE ONLY STATEMENT. IN HIS FIRMLY WORDED PRESENTATION, DICHEV CRITICIZED THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE FOR FAILING TO ALTER THE WEST'S POSITION ON ANY PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS. IN ADDITION, DICHEV TOOK A STRONG LINE IN DEFENDING EASTERN MANPOWER DATA, REJECTED ASYMMETRIC REDUCTIONS, AND DENOUNCED THE WESTERN APPROACH TO ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS. THE FULL TEXT OF THE FORMAL DELEGATION TRANSLATION OF DICHEV'S STATEMENT, WHICH WAS DELIVERED IN RUSSIAN, FOLLOWS BELOW:
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BEGIN TEXT:

1. RESPECTED COMRAD CHAIRMAN RESPECTED COLLEAGUES, IN THE STATEMENTS BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES MADE DURING THE COURSE OF THE 15TH ROUND OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, THE INTENTION HAS BEEN EXPRESSED TO FACILITATE FORWARD

MOVEMENT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CONCRETE POSITIVE RESULTS IN THEM. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES POSITIVELY ASSESS THIS SORT OF INTENTION. POSITIVELY BECAUSE FOR THEIR OWN PART THEY HAVE DONE UP UNTIL THE PRESENT TIME AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO IN THE FUTURE EVERYTHING WITHIN THEIR POWER TO ACHIEVE WEIGHTY RESULTS IN OR FORUM AND TO CARRY OUT THE RESPONSIBLE TASKS WHICH STAND BEFORE US.

2. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE CALL UPON OUR WESTERN PARTNERS TO TRANSFORM, AT LAST, THE NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE STAGE OF CLARIFYING PARTICULAR DETAILS AND FROM REFINING VARIOUS TYPES OF DATA WHICH ARE NARROW IN THEIR SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PRACTICAL ELABORATION OF A FUTURE AGREEMENT AND TO GIVE THE NEGOTIATIONS A PURPOSEFUL AND BUSINESSLIKE CHARACTER. BUT FOR THIS, IT IS NECESSARY, AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDINGS ON THE COMPLEX OF IMPORTANT QUESTIONS WHICH REMAIN OPEN AND UNAGREED.

3. UNFORTUNATELY THE LINE WHICH THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE IN PRACTICE BEEN PROSECUTING IS EVIDENCE THAT ON THE BASIC, CARDINAL PROBLEMS, WHERE THERE IS AN ABSENCE OF UNITY OF POINTS OF VIEW BETWEEN THE SIDES, THE WEST HAS NOT CHANGED ITS PATENTLY UNREALISTIC POSITION. ITS APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS AND TO THE PATHS OF THEIR SOLUTION REMAINS TODAY, IN THE SUMMER OF 1978, ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS IT WAS EVEN IN THE AUTUM OF 1973, AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.
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4. LET US TAKE FOR EXAMPLE EVEN THE QUESTIONS WHICH TOUCH UPON THE RELATIONSHIP OF ARMED FORCES CONFRONTING ONE ANOTHER IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF THEIR REDUCTION. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, DURING THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE ON MANY OCCASIONS, INCLUDING ON THE BASIS OF THE OFFICIAL NUMERICAL DATA, CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATED THAT IN THIS REGION THERE HAS ALREADY COME ABOUT AND FOR MANY YEARS BEEN MAINTAINED A RELATIVE EQUALITY OF FORCES. THIS HAS ALSO BEEN REPEATEDLY CONFIRMED BY THE WESTERN SIDE. ONE PROOF OF THIS IS THE VERY FACT THAT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED. EVIDENTLY, IT IS CLEAR TO ALL THAT IF IN EUROPE ONE OF THE SIDES HAD MAJOR ADVANTAGES OVER THE OTHER IN ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS THEN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE SIMPLY IMPOSSIBLE.

5. PROCEEDING FROM THE EXISTING REALITIES, AND ABOVE ALL FROM THE RELATIVE EQUALITY OF THE MILITARY GROUPINGS CONFRONTING ONE ANOTHER IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES JUSTLY CONSIDER THAT THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS MUST BE CARRIED OUT ON AN EQUAL, EQUAL-PERCENTAGE BASIS BY ALL STATES WHICH WILL TAKE PART IN THE FUTURE AGREEMENT. SUCH A METHOD OF REDUCTION WOULD FULLY CORRESPOND TO THE PRINCIPLES

WHICH WERE WORKED OUT DURING THE COURSE OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS NAMELY: THE REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WOULD BE MUTUAL, WOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ANY SIDE AND WOULD SERVE THE AIM OF STRENGTHENING THE STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. ALL THE STATES AND PEOPLES OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT WOULD GAIN AS A RESULT. THEIR SECURITY, AS A RESULT

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OF THE LOWERING OF THE EXTRAORDINARILY HIGH LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THIS REGION WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY STRENGTHENED.

6. NEVERTHELESS THE LATEST STATEMENTS BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE CONTINUING AS BEFORE TO PROCEED FROM THEIR PATENTLY FAR-FETCHED AND TOTALLY UNPROVEN CONCEPTS OF THE EXISTENCE OF SOME ALLEGED DISPARITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. THE STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WINTER MADE AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF 18 MAY 1978 IS RELEVANT IN THIS REGARD: "THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT, ACCORDING TO THEIR CONVICTION, THE PUBLIC OPINION, PARLIAMENTS AND GOVERNMENTS OF THEIR COUNTRIES COULD NOT ACCEPT A RESULT WHICH WOULD IGNORE THE WELL KNOWN AND CONSIDERABLE DIVERGENCIES ON THE QUESTION OF NUMERICAL DATA ON THE PERSONNEL OF THE FORCES IN THE GIVEN REGION".

7. SUCH AN ASSERTATION IS DESIGNED TO JUSTIFY THE ARTIFICIALLY
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CREATED WESTERN CONCEPTION OF "DISPARITIES" IN THE ARMED FORCES
AND CANNOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THE OFFICIAL
NUMERICAL DATA ON THE QUANTITY OF FORCES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES
AND THE WARSAW PACT STATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION WHICH HAVE
BEEN PRESENTED IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS CONFIRM THAT IN CENTRAL
EUROPE THERE EXISTS AN APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THE NUMERICAL
PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF BOTH SIDES.

8. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE, DURING THE
COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, REPEATEDLY AND, IN A WELL ARGU-
MENTED AND THOROUGH WAY, DEMONSTRATED, ON THE BASIS OF FACTUAL
DATA, THE ENTIRE GROUNDLESSNESS AND ILLOGICALITY OF THE THESIS
PUT FORWARD BY THE WEST OF THE EXISTENCE OF ALLEGED "DISPARITIES"
CONCERNING THE ARMED FORCES CONFRONTING ONE ANOTHER IN CENTRAL
EUROPE. MOREOVER, THE DELEGATIONS OF OUR COUNTRIES HAVE DONE
EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO HELP THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS
ESTABLISH THE REASONS FOR THEIR MISTAKEN APPROACH TO DETERMINING
THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF RE-
DUCTIONS. IN ADDITION WE SHOULD UNDERLINE WITH ALL FIRMNESS
THAT IF OUR WESTERN PARTNERS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CONSIDER THAT
BY INSISTING ON THEIR PATENTLY FAR-FETCHED CONCEPT OF "DIS-
PARITIES" THEY CAN IN THE END CONVINCE THE SOCIALIST STATES TO
UNDERTAKE AN "ASYMETRIC" REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES,
THEN THIS IS A DEEPLY MISTAKEN OPINION. THE PROSECUTION OF SUCH
A LINE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CAN ONLY HAVE ONE RESULT - THEIR
PROLONGATION AND THE COMPLICATION OF CONDITIONS FOR THE WORKING
OUT OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS. BULGARIA, LIKE THE OTHER
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, CANNOT AGREE WITH THE WESTERN IDEA OF
"ASYMMETRIC" REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE ITS REALISATION WOULD
LEAD TO A CLEAR DAMAGING OF THE INTERESTS OF THE SECURITY OF
THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES.

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9. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, USING EVERY
MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL TO UNDERLINE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
PROPOSALS WHICH THEY INTRODUCED ON 19 APRIL THIS YEAR, ARE
ATTEMPTING TO REPRESENT THEM AS A SERIOUS CONCESSION AND AS A
SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD TOWARDS THE DEMANDS OF THE SOCIALIST
STATES THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA
SHOULD TAKE PART IN REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE. IN PARTICULAR,
MUCH WAS SAID ABOUT THIS IN THE STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BOLLAND

AT THE LAST PLENARY MEETING.

10. IN THE NEW PROPOSALS BY THE WEST, CERTAIN OF THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE, TO SOME EXTENT, BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, FOR EXAMPLE CONCERNING THE NEED TO DEFINE THE PERIODS FOR CARRYING OUT THE REDUCTIONS OF FORCES IN THE SECOND STAGE. HOWEVER, A CAREFUL STUDY OF THESE PROPOSALS CLEARLY SHOWS THAT, ON ALL THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS OF THE REDUCTIONS, OUR WESTERN PARTNERS CONTINUE TO STAND ON THEIR EARLIER POSITIONS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY CLEAR EVEN FROM THE TREATMENT IN THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS OF THE COMMITMENT WHICH WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND CANADA CONCERNING THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN THE SECOND STAGE. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE REPEATEDLY EMPHASISED THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES WORKED OUT DURING THE COURSE OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS, EACH STATE DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE FUTURE AGREEMENT MUST UNDERTAKE AN INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT ON THE OVERALL VOLUME OF THE REDUCTION OF ITS ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. IN THE PROPOSALS OF 19 APRIL THIS YEAR, HOWEVER, IT IS ENVISAGED THAT THE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS WHICH THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA WOULD UNDERTAKE WOULD BE OF A COLLECTIVE AND NOT INDIVIDUAL CHARACTER. IN THIS REGARD WE ARE TOLD, AS WE WERE BY AMBASSADOR BOLLAND THAT "THE INTERNAL COMPOSITION OF WEST EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN REDUCTIONS CANNOT BECOME THE SUBJECT OF EAST/WEST NEGOTIATION".

11. AND WHAT IS THE REASON FOR THIS? WHY CAN ALL OF THE SOCIALIST

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STATES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS - THE GDR, POLAND, USSR AND THE CSSR TAKE UPON THEMSELVES CONCRETE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS WHILE 6 OF THE 7 WESTERN COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING CANNOT UNDERTAKE THE SAME SORT OF OBLIGATIONS? THE NATO COUNTRIES JUSTIFY THEIR POSITION BY ARGUING THAT, AS PARTICIPANTS OF THIS GROUPING, THEY ARE LINKED BY GENERAL, COLLECTIVE OBLIGATIONS AND THEREFORE CAN ONLY UNDERTAKE A COLLECTIVE REDUCTION OF FORCES. IN REGARD TO THIS WESTERN CONCEPT, WE WOULD LIKE DIRECTLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY TO SAY THAT IT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED BY US AS AN ARGUMENT WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION. THE SOCIALIST STATES ALSO HAVE THEIR GENERAL CONCEPTS IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY POLICY. NEVERTHELESS EACH OF THEM, AS HAS ALREADY BEEN INDICATED, IS READY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE REDUCTION OF ITS ARMED FORCES AS WELL AS ARMEMENTS.

12. HOW HAS THE WEST, ONE MIGHT ASK, MADE A STEP TOWARD MEETING THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES? SUCH A STEP IS NOT CONTAINED IN THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS. IN ESSENCE, IN THESE PROPOSALS THERE ARE NO REAL CHANGES FOR THE BETTER, ALSO
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IN THE OTHER BASIC QUESTION OF OUR TALKS, THAT IS: IN THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE USSR AND THE USA FOR THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE FIRST STAGE. JUST AS IN THE OLD WESTERN PROPOSALS OF 1973, SO TO IN THE NEW ONES OF 1978 WE SEE THE SAME BASELESS DEMANDS THAT THE SOVIET UNION ALREADY IN THE FIRST PHASE SHOULD REDUCT ITS GROUND FORCES BY 68,000 MEN, WHILE THE US WOULD WITHDRAW ONLY 29,000. IN THE OLD ONES AS WELL AS IN THE NEW ONES, ALTHOUGH WITH SOME MODIFICATION, IT IS FORESEEN THAT THE USSR WOULD WITHDRAW THE REDUCED FORCES IN MAJOR FORMATIONS WHILE FOR THE USA SMALL UNITS AND SUB-UNITS OR SEPARATE SERVICEMEN ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.

13. NO CHANGES ARE FORESEEN IN THE SO-CALLED "PACKAGE" CONCERNING THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. THE WEST, AS BEFORE, INSISTS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1,700 SOVIET BATTLE TANKS OFFERING IN RETURN 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND A CERTAIN QUANTITY OF THEIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

14. ALL THIS SHOWS THE EXTREMELY LIMITED CHARACTER OF THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE AND ALLOWS ONE TO UNDERLINE THAT IT DOES NOT PROVIDE THE KEY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH CONCERNS THE PRINCIPLE OF NOT DIMINISHING THE SECURITY OF EITHER OF THE SIDES.

15. THE POSITION OF THE WEST CONTINUES AS BEFORE TO REMAIN A MAJOR BRAKE ON THE NEGOTIATIONS. I HAVE IN MIND THE MANIFEST AND BASELESS ATTEMPTS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, WHICH ARE IN

NO WAY HIDDEN, TO RECEIVE FOR THEMSELVES UNILATERAL MILITARY
ADVANTAGES AT THE EXPENSE OF DIMINISHING THE SECURITY INTEREST
OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. THE ENTIRE APPROACH
TAKEN UP TIL NOW IN THE TALKS SHOWS HOWEVER THAT SUCH CAL-
CULATIONS, SUCH PROVISIONS ARE UNREAL, GROUNDLESS AND, IT FOLLOWS
THAT THEY HAVE NO CHANCES OF SUCCESS. INSTEAD OF WASTING TIME
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WE WOULD HAVE RECOMMENDED TO OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES TO CONCEN-
TRATE THEIR EFFORTS TO WORK TOGETHER TO TRANSFER THE TALKS TO A
MORE REAL BASIS, TO FACILITATE, IN AS RAPID AS POSSIBLE FULFILMENT
OF THE TASKS WHICH STAND BEFORE OUR DELEGATIONS.

16. THE BULGARIAN DELEGATION, AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE VIENNA
NEGOTIATIONS WITH SPECIAL STATUS, HAS MORE THAN ONCE PUT FOR-
WARD THE ARGUMENTS OF ITS POINT OF VIEW CONCERNING THE NECESSITY
FOR REDUCING NOT ONLY THE MANPOWER OF ARMED FORCES STATIONED IN
CENTRAL EUROPE, BUT ALSO ABOUT THE NECESSITY FOR THE REDUCTION
OF THE ARMAMENTS WITH WHICH THESE FORCES ARE EQUIPPED.

17. THE ATTEMPT OF CERTAIN WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO
CONFINE THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES MERELY TO THE DIMINISHING
OF THE MANPOWER OF THEIR GROUND FORCES WHILE AT THE SAME TIME
REFUSING THE REDUCTIONS OF ARMAMENTS SEEMS TO US COMPLETELY
INCORRECT AND GROUNDLESS. AMONG OTHER THINGS, IT CONTRADICTS
THE VERY IDEA, THE VERY PURPOSE OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS. IT FOLLOWS ALREADY FROM THEIR NAME THAT THE TALKS
MUST BE DEDICATED TO THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND
TO THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP

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OF THESE TWO BASIC AIMS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, OF COURSE, IS NOT AN ACCIDENT. IT IS COMPLETELY OBVIOUS THAT WITHOUT A LOWERING OF THE HIGH LEVEL OF CONCENTRATION OF ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT WHICH IS OCCURRING AT THE PRESENT TIME IN CENTRAL EUROPE, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE SERIOUSLY TO THINK OF A MEANINGFUL REAL LOWERING OF THE MILITARY POTENTIALS OF THE GROUPINGS CONFRONTING ONE ANOTHER IN THIS AREA.

18. THE GOVERNMENT OF MY COUNTRY AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE OTHER SOCIALIST STATES CONTINUE TO PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT THE FUTURE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE REALLY EFFECTIVE IF THERE IS NOT FIXED IN IT OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL THE DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES CONCERNING THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMAMENTS.

19. THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE WEST AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND DID NOT REMOVE THE GAPS IN THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS WHICH CONCERN THE QUESTION OF ASSURING THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRIES WITH SPECIAL STATUS. THIS CIRCUMSTANCE CANNOT BUT CAUSE DISAPPOINTMENT TO THE DELEGATION OF THE BULGARIAN
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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC. THE SOCIALIST STATES, AS IS KNOWN, ALREADY A LONG TIME AGO OFFERED CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON THIS QUESTION AND HOPE THAT THE WEST WILL ANSWER THEM POSITIVELY. THE BULGARIAN DELEGATION AND THE DELEGATIONS OF THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE MORE THAN ONCE EXPLAINED THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FROM BOTH THE POSITICAL AS WELL AS THE LEGAL AND MILITARY POINTS OF VIEW. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE REALISATION OF THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN THE SAME WAY WILL CONTRIBUTE TO AN INCREASE IN THE SECURITY OF ALL THE STATES WITH SPECIAL STATUS PARTICIPATING IN THE VIENNA TALKS.

20. RESPECTED COMRAD CHARMAN,
AS THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, THE CHAIRMAN OF THS STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEIPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, TODOR ZHIVKOV DECLARED "NOW, IN PEACETIME THE ARMS RACE IN A CERTAIN WAY IS INCREASING THE CALAMITY OF WAR. SPECIALISTS HAVE CALCULATED THAT MORE THAN 300 BILLION DOLLARS ARE CONSUMED IN THE FIRE OF THIS WILD RACE, ARE BURNT UP EMPTILY, ARE BURNT UP TO NO REAL PURPOSE. THUS MANKIND IS DOOMED TO LIVE IN CONTINUAL ALARM AND TENSION, SEES PAIN AND ANGER, AS THEIR

CHERISHED HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS, WHICH ARE THE RATIONAL USE OF THE GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL REVOLUTION, THE RAPID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRIES, THE INCREASE OF THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLES, THE RAISING OF CULTURE, AND SOCIAL PROGRESS ARE CLOUDED OR PUT OFF INTO THE DISTANT FUTURE."

21. IN THESE DAYS, THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN IN NEW YORK THERE IS PROCEEDING A DISCUSSION OF THE MOST IMPORTANT, MOST TOPICAL PROBLEM OF CONTEMPORARY TIMES, THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARRIVED AT THIS SESSION WITH THE FIRM INTENTION OF CONTRIBUTING TO ITS SUCCESS, TO FACILITATE A HALT TO THE ARMS RACE, AND TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF REAL DISARMAMENT. SPEAKING FROM THESE POSITIONS
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WHICH RESPOND TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE PEOPLES, THE DELEGATIONS OF OUR COUNTRIES UNDERLINE AT THIS SESSION THEIR READINESS, TO DO EVERYTHING WITHIN THEIR POWER, TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH ARE PROCEEDING IN VIENNA.

22. WITH WHAT DISSONANCE HAVE ECHOED ON THIS BACKGROUND THE SPEECHES OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AT THE CURRENT SESSION OF THE NATO COUNCIL IN WASHINGTON. THE FURTHER INCREASE OF MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN EUROPE WITH A PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE, AS FAR AS THE 1980S, THAT IS THE GOAL FOR THE SAKE OF WHICH ITS PARTICIPANTS HAVE MET.

23. ACCORDING TO THE CONVICTIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA AND OF THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, ONLY A CONSISTENT CONTINUATION AND STRENGTHENING OF THE POLICY OF DETENTE IN THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS IN THE MILITARY SPHERES WILL GIVE THE POSSIBILITY TO THE PEOPLES TO GO ALONG THE ROAD OF PEACE AND PROGRESS. IT IS NECESSARY TO CONTRIBUTE WITH ALL EFFORTS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE MOST IMPORTANT, MOST PRESSING TASK OF THE PRESENT DAY, WHICH IS THE HALT OF THE ARMS RACE. IN THESE CONDITIONS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS CARRIED ON BY US IS INCREASING STILL MORE. WE EXPECT THAT FINALLY, IN THE WESTERN CAPITALS A REALISTIC APPROACH TO THESE TALKS WILL PREVAIL, THAT THERE WOULD BE OPENED THE ROAD TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PROGRESS IN THE TALKS AND TO THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

24. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION. END TEXT RESOR

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